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[Crim. No. 11026. In Bank. Dec.U,1961.]

In re FREDERICK A. HOFFA1AN et al. on Habeas Corpus.

(J

[1] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Right&-Regulation-First
Amendment Activities.-Activitics that have the specific constitutional protection of U. S. Const., 1st Amend., cannot be
abridged or regulated unless the regulation is necessary,
considering available alternatives, to protect other interests,
and under this test overly broad regulations must fall.
[2] Id. - Fundamental Rights - Regulation - First Amendment
Activities.-If the state curtails freedoms protected by U. S.
Const., 1st .Amend., to protect an interest that is nonexistent,
whether claimed on behalf of the government or on behalf of
a private individual, it violates U. S. Const., 1st and 14th
Amends.
[3] Municipal Corporations-Ordinance-Validity-Impairment of
Freedom of Speech.-Although the primary uses of municipal
and railroad property can be protected by ordinances prohibiting activities that interfere with such uses, in neither case can
activities protected by U. S. Const., 1st Amend., be prohibited
solely because the property involved is not maintained primarily as a forum for such activities.
[4a,4b] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Right&-Freedom of
Expression-Scope of Protection.-The activities of about 15
persons in entering a railroad station and distributing le~flets
protesting certain foreign policy action of the U. S. and the
impending court-martial of soldiers for disobedience of orders
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 207; Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 341 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Constitutional Law, §1l3; [3]
. Municipal Corporations, § 236.6; Carriers, § 75; [4] Constitutional
Law, § 116(2); Carriers, § 15; Commerce, § 5; [5] Constitutional
Law, § 116(3); Municipal Corporations, § 236.6; [6] Municipal
Corporations, § 137; Disorderly Conduct.
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relating thereto, and acco~ting military men and others to
make their views known, were protected by U. S. Const., 1st
Amend., and coulrl not constitutionally be prohibited by the
city in the exercise of its police power nor by the railroad
under the law of trespass, where such activities were carried
on without disturbance and without interfering with the running of the railroad, and it was immaterial that another
forum, equally effective, may have been available.
[6a, 5b] Id. - Fundamental Rights - Freedom of Expression Limitation on Right: Municipal Corporations-OrdinancesValidity.-Although at railroad stations and similar terminals
activities protected by U. S. Const., 1st Amend., may be
controlled as to such factors as total numbers taking part and
the avoidance of peak hours, congested areas, dangerous zones
and littering, that part of Los Angeles Municipal Code,
§ 421.11.1, making it unlawful "to remain . . . longer than
reasonB;bly necessary to transact . . . business . . . with any
common carrier using such . . . depot," must be stricken as
unconstitutionally placing a total prohibition on such activities.
[6] Municipal Corporations-Police Power-Loitering: Disorderly
Conduct.-To "loaf or loiter," as forbidden in Los Angeles
Municipal Code, § 421.11.1, regUlating passenger terminals,
bears a "sinister or wrongful" implication, and as 80 interpreted· is a justified police measure that protects the citY'f!.
interest in assuring public safety without interfering with the
legitimate exercise of any constitutionally protected activity.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from custody. Writ granted.
A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand, Laurence R. Sperber and Michael Hannon for Petitioners.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Philip E. Grey, .Assistant
City Attorney, and Michael T. Sauer, Deputy City Attorney,
for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, C. J.-Petitioners were convicted in the Los
Angeles Municipal Court of violating a city ordinance 1
restricting the right to be in u railroad station. The Appellate
[6]

See Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Disorderly Conduct, § 3.

lLos Angeles Municipal Code section 421.11.1 provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any person to loaf or loiter in any waiting room, lobby, or
other portion of any railway station, electric railway station, airport,
or bus depot or upon the grounds of any common carrier adjacent thereto,
or to remain in any such station, airport, or depot or upon any such
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Department of the Superior Court affirmed the convictions
and refused to certify the case to the Court of Appeal. (Rule
62 (a), Cal. Rules of Court.) Petitioners seek a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the ordinance unconstitutionally
abridges their right of free speech.
Union Station in Los Angeles is owned by three railroad
companies, the Southern Pacific, the Union Pacific, and the
Santa Fe. It is a spacious area open to the community as a
center for rail transportation. It also houses a restaurant, a
snack bar, a cocktail lounge, and a magazine stand. Not only
passengers but friends and relatives of passengers may freely
enter and use the facilities of the waiting room. Entry is also
free to those who seek food or drink or magazines and newspapers. There are signs posted around the station stating:
"PRIVATE PROPERTY-PERMISSION TO PASS OVER REVOCABLE AT
ANY TIME."
About 5 0 'clock in the afternoon of September 5, 1966, a
group of about 15 persons, including petitioners, entered the
station to distribute leaflets protesting United States action in
Vietnam and the impending court martial of three soldiers at
Fort Hood, Texas, who had refused to go to Vietnam. They
hoped to eommunicate with soldiers who would be in the
station on their return to Camp Pendleton after the Labor
Day weekend. They went to the station solely to distribute
leaflets and discuss their position with persons in the area.
They circulated about the main entrance, the lobby, and the
south patio of the station. The city concedes that they did not
impede the flow of traffic to or from the station or interfere
with the purchase or sale of tickets or the conduct of business
by the restaurant, bar, or magazine and newspaper stand
located on the premises. Although their leaflets littered the
floors and seats of the lobby, the littering was by those to
whom the leaflets were given.
Officer Bakken, a special officer at Union Station, observed
grounds for a period of time longer than reasonably necessary to transact
such business as such person may have to transact with any common
carrier nsing or occupying such station, airport, or depot, provided, however, that nothing in this section will be deemed to prohibit any person
occupying such station, airport or depot or grounds adjacent thereto for
the bona fide purpose of meeting relatives or acquaintances arriving upon
any conveyance entering such place, or from accompanying or meeting
relatives or acquaintances who are departing from such station, airport,
or depot upon any public conveyance operating therefrom, and provided
further that nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any part
of said station, airport, depot or grounds let for use as a restaurant or
occupied by any other business not that of a common carrier."
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petitioners' activities and stopped them outside the station
master's office in the south patio. After learning that they
had no business with the railroad, he informed them that they
were on private property engaged in activities prohibited by
station rules. On two occasions Officer Bakken told petitioners
that they would have to leave if they did not stop distributing
leaflets and talking to people. He had similar conversations
with other members of the group. All refused to leave, and
Los Angeles police officers summoned by Officer Bakken
arrested them. The trial court acquitted six of them,2 and
found petitioners guilty on the ground that they were in the
station without any business with a carrier and hence were
loitering within the meaning of the ordinance.
The ordinance defines the law of trespass applicable to this
situation. Trespass laws punish presence on property
unauthorized by the possessor thereof and conclusively presume injury from that presence. [1] [See fn. 3] The city's
contention is essentially that thc railroads have consented to
open their property to the general public for a limited and
specific purpose only, namely, for the use of the transportation facilities offered, that petitioners admittedly: came onto
the property for other purposes, and that the railroads may
therefore demand their removal and arrest and prosecution
for trespass. 8
The theory advanced by the city has been unsuccessfully
2Eight of the group were eharged in two eonsolidated actions. Four
were acquitted on the ground that they occupied parts of the station
excluded by the second proviso of the ordinance and two on the ground
that there was no evidence to connect them with any violation of the
ordinance.
3There are two entities having an interest in this facility. The railroads
have a proprietary interest in protecting their right to use the property
for its primary purpose. The municipality has a governmental interest in
preserving its right to protect public health, safety, and order. Were it
not for the claim of specific eonstitutional proteetion for First Amendment activities, either rationale would suffiee to justify excluding petitioners from the station. Conduct not entitled to First Amendment proteetion and therefore reeeiving only the proteetion afforded by the due
proeess and equal protection clauses may be regulated or prohibited by
stntutes covering more than that necessary to protect such public or
private interests. Nor will the regulation be held invalid on the ground
that its purpose could be as effectively acbieved by alternative means
that do not curtail the activity in question. (~cc, e.g., United States v.
Carole71e Products Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 144, 152-153 [82 L.Ed. 1234,
1241-]242,58 S.Ct. 778]; compare, ibid., fn. 4, at pp. 152-153.)
Activities that have the specific constitutional protection of tbe First
Amendment, however, eannot be abridged or regulated unless tbe regulation is necessary, considering availahle alternatives, to protect otller
interesb~. Under tbis test, overly broad regulations must fall. (See, e.g.,
El/brandt v. Bussell (1966) 384 U.S. 11 [16 L.Ed.2d 321, 86 S.Ct. 1238].)
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urged to justify prohibition of First Amendment activities in
the public streets and parks. The city seeks to distinguish
streets and parks on the ground that" From time immemorial,
streets, sidewalks and parks have been held in trust for the
use of the public and have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts and discussing public
questions." (Paraphrasing Hague v. C.1.0. (1939) 307 U.S.
496,515 [83 L.Ed. 1423, 1436,59 S.Ot. 954].)
At one time it was thought that a municipality could
prohibit First Amendment activities in streets and parks on
the ground that they constituted an unauthorized use of such
facilities. (Davis v. Massachusetts (1897) 167 U.S. 43 [42
L.Ed. 71, 17 8.0t. 731].) The "time immemorial" from
which the streets and parks have been required to be held
open for First Amendment activities dates from 1939, when
Hague v. C.I.O., supra, was decided. 4 In a series of cases
following Hague v. C.I.O., the Supreme Oourt determined
that a regulation of First Amendment activities in streets and
parks must be supported by a valid municipal interest that
cannot be protected by different or more narrow means. Such
activities can be regulated ~nly to the extent necessary to
prevent interference with the municipality's interest in protecting the public health, safety, or order or in assuring the
efficient and orderly use of streets and parks for their primary
purposes. (See, e.g., Cox v. Louis'iana (1965) 379 U.S. 536,
554-555 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 483-484, 85 8.0t. 453] ; Lovell v.
C~ty of Griffin (1938) 303 U.S. 444 [82 L.Ed. 949, 58 8.0t.
666] ; Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.8. 296 [84 L.Ed.
1213, 60 8.0t. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352] ; Largent v. Texas (1943)
318 U.S. 418 [87 L.Ed. 873, 63 8.0t. 667] ; Staub v. City of
Baxley (1958) 355 U.S. 313 [2 L.Ed.2d 302, 78 8.0t. 277] ;
Schneider v. State (1939) 308 U.S. 147 [84 L.Ed. 155, 60
8.0t. 146] ; Jamison v. Texas (1943) 318 U.S. 413 [87 L.Ed.
869,63 8.0t. 669] ; Niemotko v. Ma,ryland (1950) 340 U.S. 268
[95 L.Ed. 267, 71 8.0t. 325]; compare, e.g., Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire (1942) 315 U.S. 568 [86 L.Ed. 1031, 62 8.0t
766] with OantweU v. Oonnecticut, supra, and Kllnz v. New
York (1951) 340 U.S. 290 [95 L.Ed. 267, 280, 71 8.0t. 312,
328] ; Feiner v. New York (1951) 340 U.S. 315 [95 L.Ed. 267,
295, 71 8.0t. 303, 328] with Cox v. Louisiana, supra; Kovacs
4Although the Hague ease attempted to distinguish the Davis ease
(Hague v. C.l.O., supra, at p. 515 [83 L.Ed. at p. 1436]), it actually
overruled it (Jamison v. Texas (1943) 318 U.S. 413, 415-416 [87 L.Ed.
869, 872-873, 63 S.Ct. 669]).
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v. Cooper (1949) 336 U.S. 77 [93 L.Ed. 513, 69 8.Ct. 448, 10
A.L.R.2d 608] with Saw v. New York (1948) 334 U.S. 558 [92
L.Ed. 1574, 68 8. Ct. 1148] and Wollam v. City of Palm
Springs (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 276 [29 Cal.Rptr. 1, 379 P.2d 481].
See, generally, Niemotko v. Maryland, supra, 340 U.S. 268,
275-283 [95 L.Ed. 267, 272-276, 71 8.Ct. 325].) This rule
applies whether the owner of the street is a governmental
. body or a private one. (Tucker v. Texas (1946) 326 U.S. 517,
524 [90 L.Ed. 274, 280, 66 S.Ct. 274]; Marsh v. Alabama
(1946) 326 U.S. 501 [90 L.Ed. 265, 66 8.Ct. 276].) [2] If
the state curtails First Amendment freedoms to protect an
interest that is nonexistent, whether claimed on behalf of the
government or on behalf of a private individual, it violates
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (New Yark Times Co.
v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 265 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 697, 84
8.Ct. 710, ~5 A.L.R.2d 1412]; Marsh v. Alabama, supra;
Tucker v. Texas, supra.)
[8] The primary uses of municipal property can be amply
protected by ordinances that prohibit activities that interfere
with those uses. Similarly, the primary uses of railway stations can be amply protected by ordinances prohibiting activities that interfere with those uses. In neither case can First
Amendment activities be prohibited solely because the
property involved is not maintained primarily as a forum for
such activities.
In Brown v. Louisiana (1966) 383 U.S. 131 [15 L.Ed.2d
637, 86 8.Ct. 719] the defendants were Negroes who had
entered the local segregated public library, asked for a book
and were told the library did not have it. The librarian and a
police officer then requested the defendants to leave but they
refused to do so. No one else was in the library at the time.
The defendants were not disorderly, but neither were they
using the library facilities for their intended purpose. The act
of sitting in the library was a protest against the library's
policy of segregation. The defendants were not noisy and did
not interfere with the functioning of the library.
The majority of the Supreme Court reversed a conviction
for breach of the peace on the ground that since there was no
evidence of any disorder or disturbance that interfered with
the use of the library for its intended purpose, the officer and
the librarian had no right to request the defendants to leave.
Accordingly, the defendants' refusal to leave could not
constitutionally be punished as a breach of the peace.
According to the dissenters, however, to constitute a breach
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of the peace, the activity in question did not have to interfere
with the peace, order, or safety of the public or with the
primary use of the library facility. In their view, the state
could treat any unauthorized use of property maintained to
perform a specific function as a breach of the peace. The
majority's test was whether the defendants' conduct interfered with the use of the library; the minority's test was
whether that conduct was a library use.
[4a] Similarly in the present case, the test is not whether
petitioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether
it interfered with that use. No interest of the city in the
functioning of the station as a transportation terminal was
infringed. Petitioners' conduct was also unassailable under
statutes aimed at protecting the city's interest in preserving
good order, cleanliness, public health, and safety. Nor did
their presence violate any legitimate interest of the railroads,
their patrons, or employees. It invaded no right of privacy.
(Of. Public Utilities Com. v. Pollak (1952) 343 U.S. 451 [96
L.Ed. 1068, 72 S.Ct. 813].) In this respect, a railway station
is like a public street or park. Noise and commotion are
characteristic of the normal operation of a railway station.
The railroads seek neither privacy within nor exclusive
possession of their station. They therefore cannot invoke the
law of trespass· against petitioners to protect those interests.
Nor was there any other interest that would justify prohibiting petitioners' activities. Those activities in no way
·interfered with the use of the station. They did not impede
the movement of passengers or trains, distract or interfere
with the railroad employees' conduct of their business, block
access to ticket windows, transportation facilities or other
business legitimately on the premises. Petitioners were not
noisy, they created no disturbance, and did not harass patrons
who did not wish to hear what they had to say. I)
6The only evidence in the record regarding petitioners' conduct toward
the patrons indicated that petitioners' behavior in no way amounted to
harassment or pestering. According to the testimony of Officer Bakken,
one woman "stated she had been sitting on this side but One man gave
her some literature and another started to talk to her so she moved from
here over to this side. And as I approached-the men followed her overbut as I approached, the two went out the south patio. Who they were
I do not know." Officer Bakken also testified that petitioners were
talking to two sailors and he "walked up and asked the sailors if they
were being disturbed. And this one winked at me and shook his head."
The fact that some people did not like petitioners' ideas does not mean
that the way they communicated those ideas was disorderly. (See, e.g.,
Coa; v. LO'UiBiana, 81Lpra, at pp. 551-552 [13 L.Ed.2d at pp. 482-483];

Brown v. Louisiana, B'Upra; CantweZl v. Connecticut, B'Upra.)
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Had petitioners in any way interfered with the conduct of
the railroad business, they could legitimately have been asked
to leave. (Cf. Adderley v. Florida (1966) 385 U.S. 39 [17
L.Ed.2d 149, 87 S.Ct. 242]; People v. Brown (1965) 236
Cal.App.2d Supp. 915 [47 Cal.Rptr. 662]; People v. Poe
(1965) 236 Cal.App.2d Supp. 928 [47 Cal.Rptr. 670] ; People
v. Green (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d Supp. 871 [44 Cal.Rptr.
438]. 6 ) Similarly, had petitioners' acitivities conflicted with
any valid municipal interest, the municipality could have
proceeded against them.'l
[00] The ordinance is composed primarily of two parts.
The first prohibits "loafing or loitering" in a terminal; the
second prohibits remaining in a terminal longer than necessary to transact business. The obvioUs purpose of the second
part is, as the city points out, to prevent "chaos, confusion,
congested- waiting rooms and littered lobbies [that] would
replace the orderly business conducted in the Union Station." There are ways to prevent these evils and preserve the
primary purpose of terminals, however, without forbidding
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms within them.- (Cf.
Wollam v. Oity of Palm Springs, supra, at pp. 285-286.)
Litteripg. is subject to effective control by means less drastic
(Sheltonv. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 488 [5 L.Ed.2d 231,
237,81 8.Ct. 247]) than forbidding the distribution of leaflets
altogether (Schneider v. State, supra, at p. 162 [84 L.Ed. at
p. 165]). Congestion can be avoided by controls on activities
60f course, the degree of interference with business operations need
not reach the level attained by the defendants in the "bank-in" eases
(People v. Brown, su.pra; People v. Green, su.pra; People v. Poe, 8'Upra)
before a proprietor may demand their removal. As stated above, any
appreciable interference with the orderly carrying on of business may
suffice. A bank may well have security problems akin to those of a jail,
that permit it altogether to prohibit First Amendment. activities inside
its premises. (Of. ~dderley v. Florida, 8'Upra.) Some interference, however, must be shown. (Of. Thomas v. Oollins {1944) 323 U.S. 516, 531
[89 L.Ed. 430, 440, 65 S.Ot. 315].)
'lIt is immaterial that another forum, equally effective, may have beeD - -available to petitioners. As stated in Schneider v. State, npra, 308 U.S,
147, 163 [84 L.Ed. 155, 165]: "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his
liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it
may be exercised in some other place." Absent the presence of some
conflicting interest that could be protected in no other way, petitioners
have the right to choose their own forum. Since there is no competing
interest present in this case, there is no need to balance, and we need
not review those instances where the narrowness of the issue restricts the .
appropriate audience, creating a compelling need for a particular forum
that may be upheld against a very slight competing interest. (Cf.
Schwartz-Torrance 111,11. Oorp. v. Bakery ct Oonfectionery Workers' Union
(1964) 61 Oa1.2d 766 [40 Oal.Rptr. 233, 394 P.2d 921].)
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during peak hours. (See, e.g., Cottonreader v. Johnson (1966)
252 F.Supp. 492, 500; Hurwitt v. City of Oakland (1965) 247
F.Supp. 995; cf. Edwards v. South Oar olin a (1963) 372 U.S.
229, 236 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 702, 83 8.Ct. 680].) Reasonable and
objective limitations can be placed on the number of persons
who can be present for First Amendment activities at the
same time, and the persons present can be required so to place
themselves as to limit disruption. (See, e.g., Hurwitt v. City
of Oakland, supra.) In areas normally subject to congestion,
such as ticKet windows and turnstiles, First Amendment
activities can be prohibited. (Cf. Adderley v. Florida, supra;
People v. Brown, supra; People v. Poe, supra; People v.
Green, supra.) Persons can be excluded entirely from areas
where their presence would threaten personal danger or block
the flow of passenger or carrier traffic, such as doorways and
loading areas. (Cf. Adderley v. Florida, supra; People v.
Brown, supra; People v. Green, supra.)
In short, the second part of the ordinance completely
prohibits protected activities although a narrower measure
would fully achieve the intended ends and at the same time
preserve an effective. place for the dissemination of ideas.
Because of the overbreadth of coverage in this ordinance, the
language prohibiting presence in a terminal longer than
reasonably necessary to conduct business with a carrier is
unconstitutional. 8 (Cf. Elfbrandt v. Russell (1966) 384 U.S.
11 [16 L.Ed.2d 321, 86 8.Ct. 1238].)
[6] The first part of the ordinance forbids anyone to
"loaf or loiter" about a terminal. For the reasons expressed
in In re Cregler (1961) 56 Cal.2d 308, 312 [14 Cal.Rptr. 289,
363 P .2d 305], we construe the phrase "loaf or loiter" to
bear a "sinister or wrongful" implication. As so interpreteu
the first part of the ordinance is a justified police measure
that protects the city's interest in assuring public safety (cf.
Gleason v. Municipal Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 584, 587
[38 Cal.Rptr. 226]) without interfering with the legitimate
exercise of any constitutionally protected activity.
[5b] Striking the part of the ordinance that we have held
to be unconstitutional does not "vitiate the whole act." (Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 536.
8The specific language we refer to is: ". . . or to remain in any such
station, airport, or depot or upon any such grounds for a period of time
longer than reasonahly necessary to transact such business as such person
may have to transact with any common carrier using or occupying such
station, airport, or depot. . • ."
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555 [171 P.2d 885], quoting from People v. Lewis (1939) 13
Ca1.2d 280, 284 [89 P .2d 388].) Accordingly, all but the
particular language we have indicated may stand.
[4b] The trial court applied the Oregler definition of
"loiter" and found that petitioners violated the first part of
the ordinance. The record clearly indicates that the court
reached this conclusion by finding that petitioners violated the
second part of the ordinance and then reasoning that they
were therefore present without any" lawful purpose." Since
the second part of the ordinance is broader than constitutionally permissible, petitioners' convictions cannot stand
under any theory, for there is no other evidence that they
were present in Union Station for an "unlawful" purpose.
The writ is granted and the petitioners are discharged from
custody.
Peters, 'J., Tobriner, J., Mosk,. J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
BURKE, J., Dissenting.
In my view the city ordinance prOVISIon in question is
entirely reasonable and constitutes a necessary and proper
exercise of the police power of a city.1
It seeks to prevent occurrences in highly volatile, sensitive
areas of public terminals by preventing unnecessary loitering
or remaining in such terminals by persons who have no legitimate business being there.
It should not be necessary to await a disturbance, interference, riot, theft, pickpocketing, baggage snatching, blocking passage, soliciting for improper purposes or interference
with the business of the common carriers involved, before a
valid municipal interest arises to warrant the enactment or
enforcement of the ordinance here involved. 2
Airports, railway stations, and bus depots - and their
patrons-are faced with problems peculiar to themselves and
not common to those of public streets, parks, playgrounds,
libraries, museums, zoos, theaters, auditoriums, or public restrooms. As one reflects upon each of the kinds of places mentioned one realizes that each has its sensitive areas and
IClllifornia Constitution, article XI, Nection 11.
2I.e., the portion of the ortlin:lIIce which makes it unlawful to remain
in any railway station, airport, or bUB depot or the grounds for longer
than reasonably necessary to transact business with any common carrier
using or occupying such station, airport, or depot.
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requires a body of law to protect the interests of all who are
involved in utilizing such places. Such regulations evolve, as
here, over a long period of time and not all reasons for them
are as readily apparent as here. The determination of the need
for such regulations has been entrusted by law to the appropriate governing boards, and their legislative acts are entitled
to be upheld by the courts unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. There is no semblance of such a
showing here.
Mass transportation terminals are designed to serve the
convenience and interest of the traveling public and require
the handling of large numbers of persons and baggage.
Crowds of friends or relatives meeting passengers or seeing
them off add to the mass of people frequenting terminals.
Problems of lost luggage and lost persons, including the very
elderly, the very young, the halt, lame and blind, are frequent.
The mere presence of Travelers Aid desks in common carrier
terminals, to lend assistance to those needing- it, is indicative
that such stations are places where confusion and distractions
abound. Often last minute connections must be attempted or
undue delays endured. The common good demands that
unnecessary interferences with the operation of such terminals be eliminated. That is the proper public purpose sought
to be served by the city ordinance in question.
It is a matter of common knowledge, which police records
confirm, that amid the confusion incident to arrivals and
departures, luggage and purses are vulnerable to being
snatched and pickpockets can and do operate profitably.
Airports, bus depots, and railroad stations are places of
escape, of rapid ingress and egress from metropolitan areas,
and are often required to be placed ,under surveillance by
federal, state and local police agencies. Other government
agencies such as customs officers, agricultural inspectors,
narcotic law enforcement officers, and health and quarantine
officials are often on duty in such terminals.
Furthermore, it is common knowledge that persons frequenting stations, depots and airports are often under heavy
emotional stress, being parted from, or united with loved
ones; they are preoccupied with last minute personal communications and deserve what little privacy may be left to
them. In some terminals many would-be passengers are waiting on a standby basis, particularly armed forces personnel,
not knowing from one minute to the next whether they will be

'I,

leaving or staying. In such situations emotions run high,
nerves are taut and conditions are volatile.
Terminals are normally surrounded by broad public sidewalk areas readily available for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the distribution of handbills and like activities.
Travelers gain access to the premises or leave by such sidewalks. It does not appear to constitute an unreasonable interference with First Amendment rights to require that persons
desiring to exercise such rights withdraw to the public sidewalk areas to contact travelers for their purposes.
The municipal regulation here involved should be upheld as
a valid and reasonable approach to the maintenance of law
and order and the protection of the traveling public, and not
to constitute an undue interference with the exercise of First
Amendment rights.
I would deny the writ.

:)

McComb, J., concurred.
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